Previous research suggests that "direct" reforms to the liability system - reforms designed to reduce the level of compensation to potential claimants - reduce medical expenditures without important consequences for patient health outcomes. We extend this research by identifying the mechanisms through which reforms affect the behavior of health care providers. Although we find that direct reforms improve medical productivity primarily by reducing malpractice claims rates and compensation conditional on a claim, our results suggest that other policies that reduce the time spent and the amount of conflict involved in defending against a claim can also reduce defensive practices substantially. In addition, we find that "malpractice pressure" has a larger impact on diagnostic rather than therapeutic treatment decisions. Our results provide an empirical foundation for simulating the effects of untried malpractice reforms on health care costs and outcomes, based on their predicted effects on the malpractice pressure facing medical providers.

Health care report cards - public disclosure of patient health outcomes at the level of the individual physician and/or hospital - may address important informational asymmetries in markets for health care, but they may also give doctors and hospitals incentives to decline to treat more difficult, severely ill patients. Whether report cards are good for patients and for society depends on whether their financial and health benefits outweigh their costs in terms of the quantity, quality, and appropriateness of medical treatment that they induce. Using national data on Medicare patients at risk for cardiac surgery, we find that cardiac surgery report cards in New York and Pennsylvania led both to selection behavior by providers and to improved matching of patients with hospitals. On net, this led to higher levels of resource use and to worse health outcomes, particularly for sicker patients. We conclude that, at least in the short run, these report cards decreased patient and social welfare.

We present a methodology and database mediator tool for integrating modern knowledge-based systems, such as the Stanford EON architecture for automated guideline-based decision-support, with legacy databases, such as the Veterans Health Information Systems & Technology Architecture (VISTA) systems, which are used nation-wide. Specifically, we discuss designs for database integration in ATHENA, a system for hypertension care based on EON, at the VA Palo Alto Health Care System. We describe a new database mediator that affords the EON system both physical and logical data independence from the legacy VA database. We found that to achieve our design goals, the mediator requires two separate mapping levels and must itself involve a knowledge-based component.

What should be government's role in a market-oriented health care system?

What's the appropriate amount of regulation?

Who should regulate-states, federal government, or market forces?

What role do the courts play in this regulation?

Are there existing models that might guide leaders in designing an effective regulatory structure?

Welcome to the great managed care debate. In Regulating Managed Care, twenty-six of the nation's leading health policy experts give health care administrators, clinicians, and policy makers insight into the issues behind this critical exchange and provide leaders with a road map to assess the policy options available to protect the quality of our health care delivery system.