BACKGROUND: Both genetic and environmental factors contribute to human diseases. Most common diseases are influenced by a large number of genetic and environmental factors, most of which individually have only a modest effect on the disease. Though genetic contributions are relatively well characterized for some monogenetic diseases, there has been no effort at curating the extensive list of environmental etiological factors.

RESULTS: From a comprehensive search of the MeSH annotation of MEDLINE articles, we identified 3,342 environmental etiological factors associated with 3,159 diseases. We also identified 1,100 genes associated with 1,034 complex diseases from the NIH Genetic Association Database (GAD), a database of genetic association studies. 863 diseases have both genetic and environmental etiological factors available. Integrating genetic and environmental factors results in the "etiome", which we define as the comprehensive compendium of disease etiology. Clustering of environmental factors may alert clinicians of the risks of added exposures, or synergy in interventions to alter these factors. Clustering of both genetic and environmental etiological factors puts genes in the context of environment in a quantitative manner.

CONCLUSION: In this paper, we obtained a comprehensive list of associations between disease and environmental factors using MeSH annotation of MEDLINE articles. It serves as a summary of current knowledge between etiological factors and diseases. By combining the environmental etiological factors and genetic factors from GAD, we computed the "etiome" profile for 863 diseases. Comparing diseases across these profiles may have utility for clinical medicine, basic science research, and population-based science.

BACKGROUND: Concern about patient safety has promoted efforts to improve safety climate. A better understanding of how patient safety climate differs among distinct work areas and disciplines in hospitals would facilitate the design and implementation of interventions. OBJECTIVES: To understand workers' perceptions of safety climate and ways in which climate varies among hospitals and by work area and discipline. RESEARCH DESIGN: We administered the Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare Organizations survey in 2004-2005 to personnel in a stratified random sample of 92 US hospitals. SUBJECTS: We sampled 100% of senior managers and physicians and 10% of all other workers. We received 18,361 completed surveys (52% response). MEASURES: The survey measured safety climate perceptions and worker and job characteristics of hospital personnel. We calculated and compared the percent of responses inconsistent with a climate of safety among hospitals, work areas, and disciplines. RESULTS: Overall, 17% of responses were inconsistent with a safety climate. Patient safety climate differed by hospital and among and within work areas and disciplines. Emergency department personnel perceived worse safety climate and personnel in nonclinical areas perceived better safety climate than workers in other areas. Nurses were more negative than physicians regarding their work unit's support and recognition of safety efforts, and physicians showed marginally more fear of shame than nurses. For other dimensions of safety climate, physician-nurse differences depended on their work area. CONCLUSIONS: Differences among and within hospitals suggest that strategies for improving safety climate and patient safety should be tailored for work areas and disciplines.

BACKGROUND: Strengthening hospital safety culture offers promise for reducing adverse events, but efforts to improve culture may not succeed if hospital managers perceive safety differently from frontline workers.

OBJECTIVES: To determine whether frontline workers and supervisors perceive a more negative patient safety climate (ie, surface features, reflective of the underlying safety culture) than senior managers in their institutions. To ascertain patterns of variation within management levels by professional discipline.

RESEARCH DESIGN: A safety climate survey was administered from March 2004 to May 2005 in 92 US hospitals. Individual-level cross sectional comparisons related safety climate to management level. Hierarchical and hospital-fixed effects modeling tested differences in perceptions.

SUBJECTS: Random sample of hospital personnel (18,361 respondents).

MEASURES: Frequency of responses indicating absence of safety climate (percent problematic response) overall and for 8 survey dimensions.

RESULTS: Frontline workers' safety climate perceptions were 4.8 percentage points (1.4 times) more problematic than were senior managers', and supervisors' perceptions were 3.1 percentage points (1.25 times) more problematic than were senior managers'. Differences were consistent among 7 safety climate dimensions. Differences by management level depended on discipline: senior manager versus frontline worker discrepancies were less pronounced for physicians and more pronounced for nurses, than they were for other disciplines.

CONCLUSIONS: Senior managers perceived patient safety climate more positively than nonsenior managers overall and across 7 discrete safety climate domains. Patterns of variation by management level differed by professional discipline. Continuing efforts to improve patient safety should address perceptual differences, both among and within groups by management level.

Objective: To assess variation in safety climate across VA hospitals nationally.

Study Setting: Data were collected from employees at 30 VA hospitals over a 6-month period using the Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare Organizations survey.

Study Design: We sampled 100 percent of senior managers and physicians and a random 10 percent of other employees. At 10 randomly selected hospitals, we sampled an additional 100 percent of employees working in units with intrinsically higher hazards (high-hazard units [HHUs]).

Data Collection: Data were collected using an anonymous survey design.

Principal Findings: We received 4,547 responses (49 percent response rate). The percent problematic response-lower percent reflecting higher levels of patient safety climate-ranged from 12.0-23.7 percent across hospitals (mean=17.5 percent). Differences in safety climate emerged by management level, clinician status, and workgroup. Supervisors and front-line staff reported lower levels of safety climate than senior managers; clinician responses reflected lower levels of safety climate than those of nonclinicians; and responses of employees in HHUs reflected lower levels of safety climate than those of workers in other areas.

Conclusions: This is the first systematic study of patient safety climate in VA hospitals. Findings indicate an overall positive safety climate across the VA, but there is room for improvement.

Patient safety has been a priority in health care since Hippocrates admonished physicians to "first do no harm." Even so, the Institute of Medicine found in 2000 that approximately 98 000 patients die from preventable medical errors each year. Recent US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates project that 270 individuals die each day from hospital-acquired infections. Despite substantial efforts and investments, widespread and substantial improvement is not evident.

The problem is not in knowing what to do. Techniques, tools, and some best practices are available, and many health care organizations are making efforts to apply them. The importance of creating a "culture of safety" has also been noted. This involves continuous vigilance or mindfulness, learning, and accountability. A greater emphasis on safety over productivity and on teamwork over individual autonomy, increased standardization and simplification, and the implementation of an environment in which personnel are encouraged and feel comfortable to report errors and mistakes are needed.

Although creating a culture of safety is important, creating a culture of systems is a more fundamental challenge. In this Commentary, the term systems means systems of care that occur both within and across organizations. For example, in studies involving causes of adverse events in cardiac surgery, more than two-thirds were classified as nontechnical or systems-oriented issues including delays and missing equipment, and more of these problems occurred in cases with adverse outcomes than in successful cases. The greatest barrier to patient safety and safety culture is the inherent fragmentation of the US system of care. Safety will improve when the underlying system of care improves.