Yet there has been no national-level, comprehensive review of the evidence for public health emergency preparedness and response (PHEPR) practices. Recognizing this deficiency, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) went to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine three years ago and asked them to convene a national panel of public health experts to review the evidence for emergency preparedness and response. The committee members included Stanford Health Policy Director Douglas K. Owens. The committee issued its findings July 14 with a report at a Zoom conference.

Author information: IOM (Institute of Medicine) and NRC (National Research Council). (Committee: Goldstein BD, DeSimone JM, Ascher MS, Buehler JW, Cook KS, Crouch NA, Doyle FJ, Foldy S, Gursky EA, Hoffman S, Johnson CB, Keim P, Kellerman AL, Kleinman KP, Layton M, Lee EK, Mayor SD, Moshier TF, Murphy FA, Murray RW, Owens DK, Pollock SM, Resnick IG, Schaudies RP, Schultz JS)

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the anthrax letters, the ability to detect biological threats as quickly as possible became a top priority. In 2003 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) introduced the BioWatch program--a federal monitoring system intended to speed detection of specific biological agents that could be released in aerosolized form during a biological attack. 

The present volume evaluates the costs and merits of both the current BioWatch program and the plans for a new generation of BioWatch devices. BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance also examines infectious disease surveillance through hospitals and public health agencies in the United States, and considers whether BioWatch and traditional infectious disease surveillance are redundant or complementary.