A critical question in planning a response to bioterrorism is how antibiotics and medical supplies should be stockpiled and dispensed. The objective of this work was to evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative strategies for maintaining and dispensing local and regional inventories of antibiotics and medical supplies for responses to anthrax bioterrorism. We modeled the regional and local supply chain for antibiotics and medical supplies as well as local dispensing capacity. We found that mortality was highly dependent on the local dispensing capacity, the number of individuals requiring prophylaxis, adherence to prophylactic antibiotics, and delays in attack detection. For an attack exposing 250,000 people and requiring the prophylaxis of 5 million people, expected mortality fell from 243,000 to 145,000 as the dispensing capacity increased from 14,000 to 420,000 individuals per day. At low dispensing capacities (14,000 individuals per day), nearly all exposed individuals died, regardless of the rate of adherence to prophylaxis, delays in attack detection, or availability of local inventories. No benefit was achieved by doubling local inventories at low dispensing capacities; however, at higher dispensing capacities, the cost-effectiveness of doubling local inventories fell from $100,000 to $20,000/life year gained as the annual probability of an attack increased from 0.0002 to 0.001. We conclude that because of the reportedly rapid availability of regional inventories, the critical determinant of mortality following anthrax bioterrorism is local dispensing capacity. Bioterrorism preparedness efforts directed at improving local dispensing capacity are required before benefits can be reaped from enhancing local inventories.

Objectives:

To systematically review the literature about children with anthrax to describe their clinical course, treatment responses, and the predictors of disease progression and mortality.

Data Sources:

MEDLINE® (1966-2005), 14 selected journal indexes (1900-1966) and bibliographies of all retrieved articles.

Review Methods:

We sought case reports of pediatric anthrax published between 1900 and 2005 meeting predefined criteria. We abstracted three types of data from the English-language reports:

Patient information (e.g., age, gender, nationality).

Symptom and disease progression information (e.g., whether the patient developed meningitis).

Treatment information (e.g., treatments received, year of treatment).

We compared the clinical symptoms and disease progression variables for the pediatric cases with data on adult anthrax cases reviewed previously.

Results:

We identified 246 titles of potentially relevant articles from our MEDLINE® search and 2253 additional references from our manual search of the bibliographies of retrieved articles and the indexes of the 14 selected journals. We included 62 case reports of pediatric anthrax including two inhalational cases, 20 gastrointestinal cases, 37 cutaneous cases, and three atypical cases.

Anthrax is a relatively common and historically well-recognized disease and yet rarely reported among children, suggesting the possibility of significant under-diagnosis, underreporting, and/or publication bias. Children with anthrax present with a wide range of clinical signs and symptoms, which differ somewhat from the presenting features of adults with anthrax. Like adults, children with gastrointestinal anthrax have two distinct clinical presentations:

Upper tract disease characterized by dysphagia and oropharyngeal findings.

Lower tract disease characterized by fever, abdominal pain, and nausea and vomiting.

Additionally, children with inhalational disease may have "atypical" presentations including primary meningoencephalitis. Children with inhalational anthrax have abnormal chest roentgenograms; however, children with other forms of anthrax usually have normal roentgenograms. Nineteen of the 30 children (63%) who received penicillin-based antibiotics survived; whereas nine of 11 children (82%) who received anthrax antiserum survived.

Conclusions:

There is a broad spectrum of clinical signs and symptoms associated with pediatric anthrax. The limited data available regarding disease progression and treatment responses for children infected with anthrax suggest some differences from adult populations. Preparedness planning efforts should specifically address the needs of pediatric victims.

Postoperative pulmonary complications play an important role in the risk for patients undergoing noncardiothoracic surgery. Postoperative pulmonary complications are as prevalent as cardiac complications and contribute similarly to morbidity, mortality, and length of stay. Pulmonary complications may even be more likely than cardiac complications to predict long-term mortality after surgery. The purpose of this guideline is to provide guidance to clinicians on clinical and laboratory predictors of perioperative pulmonary risk before noncardiothoracic surgery. It also evaluates strategies to reduce the perioperative pulmonary risk and focuses on atelectasis, pneumonia, and respiratory failure. The target audience for this guideline is general internists or other clinicians involved in perioperative management of surgical patients. The target patient population is all adult persons undergoing noncardiothoracic surgery.

Background: Weaponized Bacillus anthracis is one of the few biological agents that can cause death and disease in sufficient numbers to devastate an urban setting.

Objective: To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of strategies for prophylaxis and treatment of an aerosolized B. anthracis bioterror attack.

Design: Decision analytic model.

Data Sources: We derived probabilities of anthrax exposure, vaccine and treatment characteristics, and their costs and associated clinical outcomes from the medical literature and bioterrorism-preparedness experts.

Target Population: Persons living and working in a large metropolitan U.S. city.

Time Horizon: Patient lifetime.

Perspective: Societal.

Intervention: We evaluated 4 postattack strategies: no prophylaxis, vaccination alone, antibiotic prophylaxis alone, or vaccination and antibiotic prophylaxis, as well as preattack vaccination versus no vaccination.

Outcome Measures: Costs, quality-adjusted life-years, life-years, and incremental cost-effectiveness.

Results of Base-Case Analysis: If an aerosolized B. anthracis bioweapon attack occurs, postexposure prophylactic vaccination and antibiotic therapy for those potentially exposed is the most effective (0.33 life-year gained per person) and least costly ($355 saved per person) strategy, as compared with vaccination alone. At low baseline probabilities of attack and exposure, mass previous vaccination of a metropolitan population is more costly ($815 million for a city of 5 million people) and not more effective than no vaccination.

Results of Sensitivity Analysis: If prophylactic antibiotics cannot be promptly distributed after exposure, previous vaccination may become cost-effective.

Limitations: The probability of exposure and disease critically depends on the probability and mechanism of bioweapon release.

Conclusions: In the event of an aerosolized B. anthracis bioweapon attack over an unvaccinated metropolitan U.S. population, postattack prophylactic vaccination and antibiotic therapy is the most effective and least expensive strategy.

The third edition has 120 new articles, among them Artificial nutrition and hydration, Bioterrorism, Cloning, Cybernetics, Dementia, Managed care, and Nanotechnology. Some 200 articles have been extensively revised, and 100 additional articles have new bibliographies. The alphabetical entries address a wide range of topics that raise difficult and important questions. Abortion, genetic screening, female genital mutilation, the right to die, health issues of immigration, and corporate responsibility are but a few. The contributors discuss the issues from many points of view. The abortion article includes sections covering medical perspectives, contemporary ethical and legal aspects, and Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, and Islamic religious perspectives. There are also articles about bioethics in Buddhism, eugenics, health policy, women as health-care professionals, whistle-blowing in health care, and veterinary ethics. All of the articles are signed, and all have bibliographies. Ample cross-references help readers find related useful material. A list of all the articles and a topical outline appear in volume 1. A series of appendixes offers codes, oaths, and directives related to bioethics; additional resources; key legal cases; and an annotated bibliography of literary works that have a medical component. A detailed index helps users find material that may be scattered over numerous entries, such as information about surrogate motherhood.

BACKGROUND: Given the threat of bioterrorism and the increasing availability of electronic data for surveillance, surveillance systems for the early detection of illnesses and syndromes potentially related to bioterrorism have proliferated.

PURPOSE: To critically evaluate the potential utility of existing surveillance systems for illnesses and syndromes related to bioterrorism.

DATA SOURCES: Databases of peer-reviewed articles (for example, MEDLINE for articles published from January 1985 to April 2002) and Web sites of relevant government and nongovernment agencies.

STUDY SELECTION: Reports that described or evaluated systems for collecting, analyzing, or presenting surveillance data for bioterrorism-related illnesses or syndromes.

DATA EXTRACTION: From each included article, the authors abstracted information about the type of surveillance data collected; method of collection, analysis, and presentation of surveillance data; and outcomes of evaluations of the system.

DATA SYNTHESIS: 17 510 article citations and 8088 government and nongovernmental Web sites were reviewed. From these, the authors included 115 systems that collect various surveillance reports, including 9 syndromic surveillance systems, 20 systems collecting bioterrorism detector data, 13 systems collecting influenza-related data, and 23 systems collecting laboratory and antimicrobial resistance data. Only the systems collecting syndromic surveillance data and detection system data were designed, at least in part, for bioterrorism preparedness applications. Syndromic surveillance systems have been deployed for both event-based and continuous bioterrorism surveillance. Few surveillance systems have been comprehensively evaluated. Only 3 systems have had both sensitivity and specificity evaluated.

LIMITATIONS: Data from some existing surveillance systems (particularly those developed by the military) may not be publicly available.

CONCLUSIONS: Few surveillance systems have been specifically designed for collecting and analyzing data for the early detection of a bioterrorist event. Because current evaluations of surveillance systems for detecting bioterrorism and emerging infections are insufficient to characterize the timeliness or sensitivity and specificity, clinical and public health decision making based on these systems may be compromised.

The anthrax attacks of 2001, the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and weapons of mass destruction tabletop exercises have made it clear that no single community can prepare fully, nor respond completely, to a large-scale bioterrorism event. Policymakers recognize the need to forge relationships and coordinate preparedness planning efforts at the local, state, national, and international levels.1 However, there is little consensus about the optimal level of localization or regionalization for each of the resources and services that must be operationalized during a bioterrorism response.

We sought to evaluate the evidence regarding the effectiveness of existing regional systems that facilitate a response to bioterrorism. We sought evidence regarding the tasks that would need to be performed during a bioterrorism response (such as triage, provision of emergency medical care, transportation, and surveillance) and regionalized organizations that would likely contribute personnel, material, and information required to perform these bioterrorism response tasks.

The key questions addressed in this report are:

*What are the key tasks of local responders - such as local public health officials, clinicians, and emergency medical personnel - during a bioterrorism event?

*What resources do local responders require to perform the tasks identified in Key Question 1?

*Which existing regional systems for delivery of goods and services could be relevant to supplying the resources identified in Key Question 2?

*Can regionalization of bioterrorism preparedness planning facilitate supplying needed resources to local responders during a bioterrorism event?

*How do geographic variations in the affected population (e.g., urban as opposed to rural), special populations, and the interplay of private and public sector players affect regionalized systems?

This issue of CHP/PCOR's quarterly newsletter covers news and developments from the winter 2004 quarter. It features articles about CHP/PCOR faculty member Mark McClellan's new position as administrator of the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; a report by the Stanford-UCSF Evidence-based Practice Center evaluating the regionalization of bioterrorism preparedness and response; the development of a research protocol for a World Health Organization study on the effectiveness of public-private partnerships in health care; a new design for CHP/PCOR's Web site; and a roundup of last quarter's media coverage highlighting the centers' research work.