This interview by Bruce Goldman was originally published by the Stanford School of Medicine.

On May 13, the journal Science published a letter, signed by 18 scientists, stating that it was still unclear whether the virus that causes COVID-19 emerged naturally or was the result of a laboratory accident, but that neither cause could be ruled out. David Relman, MD, the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor and professor of microbiology and immunology, spearheaded the effort.

Relman is no stranger to complicated microbial threat scenarios and illness of unclear origin. He has advised the U.S. government on emerging infectious diseases and potential biological threats. He served as vice chair of a National Academy of Sciences committee reviewing the FBI investigation of letters containing anthrax that were sent in 2001. Recently, he chaired another academy committee that assessed a cluster of poorly explained illnesses in U.S. embassy employees. He is a past president of the Infectious Diseases Society of America.

Stanford Medicine science writer Bruce Goldman asked Relman to explain what remains unknown about the coronavirus’s emergence, what we may learn and what’s at stake.

1. How might SARS-CoV-2, which causes COVID-19, have first infected humans?

Relman: We know very little about its origins. The virus’s closest known relatives were discovered in bats in Yunnan Province, China, yet the first known cases of COVID-19 were detected in Wuhan, about 1,000 miles away.

There are two general scenarios by which this virus could have made the jump to humans. First, the jump, or “spillover,” might have happened directly from an animal to a human, by means of an encounter that took place within, say, a bat-inhabited cave or mine, or closer to human dwellings — say, at an animal market. Or it could have happened indirectly, through a human encounter with some other animal to which the primary host, presumably a bat, had transmitted the virus.

Bats and other potential SARS-CoV-2 hosts are known to be shipped across China, including to Wuhan. But if there were any infected animals near or in Wuhan, they haven’t been publicly identified.

Maybe someone became infected after contact with an infected animal in or near Yunnan, and moved on to Wuhan. But then, because of the high transmissibility of this virus, you’d have expected to see other infected people at or near the site of this initial encounter, whether through similar animal exposure or because of transmission from this person.

2. What’s the other scenario?

Relman: SARS-CoV-2 could have spent some time in a laboratory before encountering humans. We know that some of the largest collections of bat coronaviruses in the world — and a vigorous research program involving the creation of “chimeric” bat coronaviruses by integrating unfamiliar coronavirus genomic sequences into other, known coronaviruses — are located in downtown Wuhan. And we know that laboratory accidents happen everywhere there are laboratories.

All scientists need to acknowledge a simple fact: Humans are fallible, and laboratory accidents happen — far more often than we care to admit. Several years ago, an investigative reporter uncovered evidence of hundreds of lab accidents across the United States involving dangerous, disease-causing microbes in academic institutions and government centers of excellence alike — including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health.

SARS-CoV-2 might have been lurking in a sample collected from a bat or other infected animal, brought to a laboratory, perhaps stored in a freezer, then propagated in the laboratory as part of an effort to resurrect and study bat-associated viruses. The materials might have been discarded as a failed experiment. Or SARS-CoV-2 could have been created through commonly used laboratory techniques to study novel viruses, starting with closely related coronaviruses that have not yet been revealed to the public. Either way, SARS-CoV-2 could have easily infected an unsuspecting lab worker and then caused a mild or asymptomatic infection that was carried out of the laboratory.

3. Why is it important to understand SARS-CoV-2’s origins?

Relman: Some argue that we would be best served by focusing on countering the dire impacts of the pandemic and not diverting resources to ascertaining its origins. I agree that addressing the pandemic’s calamitous effects deserves high priority. But it’s possible and important for us to pursue both. Greater clarity about the origins will help guide efforts to prevent a next pandemic. Such prevention efforts would look very different depending on which of these scenarios proves to be the most likely.

Evidence favoring a natural spillover should prompt a wide variety of measures to minimize human contact with high-risk animal hosts. Evidence favoring a laboratory spillover should prompt intensified review and oversight of high-risk laboratory work and should strengthen efforts to improve laboratory safety. Both kinds of risk-mitigation efforts will be resource intensive, so it’s worth knowing which scenario is most likely.

4. What attempts at investigating SARS-CoV-2’s origin have been made so far, with what outcomes?

Relman: There’s a glaring paucity of data. The SARS-CoV-2 genome sequence, and those of a handful of not-so-closely-related bat coronaviruses, have been analyzed ad nauseam. But the near ancestors of SARS-CoV-2 remain missing in action. Absent that knowledge, it’s impossible to discern the origins of this virus from its genome sequence alone. SARS-CoV-2 hasn’t been reliably detected anywhere prior to the first reported cases of disease in humans in Wuhan at the end of 2019. The whole enterprise has been made even more difficult by the Chinese national authorities’ efforts to control and limit the release of public health records and data pertaining to laboratory research on coronaviruses.

In mid-2020, the World Health Organization organized an investigation into the origins of COVID-19, resulting in a fact-finding trip to Wuhan in January 2021. But the terms of reference laying out the purposes and structure of the visit made no mention of a possible laboratory-based scenario. Each investigating team member had to be individually approved by the Chinese government. And much of the data the investigators got to see was selected prior to the visit and aggregated and presented to the team by their hosts.

The recently released final report from the WHO concluded — despite the absence of dispositive evidence for either scenario — that a natural origin was “likely to very likely” and a laboratory accident “extremely unlikely.” The report dedicated only 4 of its 313 pages to the possibility of a laboratory scenario, much of it under a header entitled “conspiracy theories.” Multiple statements by one of the investigators lambasted any discussion of a laboratory origin as the work of dark conspiracy theorists. (Notably, that investigator — the only American selected to be on the team — has a pronounced conflict of interest.)

Given all this, it’s tough to give this WHO report much credibility. Its lack of objectivity and its failure to follow basic principles of scientific investigation are troubling. Fortunately, WHO’s director-general recognizes some of the shortcomings of the WHO effort and has called for a more robust investigation, as have the governments of the United States, 13 other countries and the European Union.

5. What’s key to an effective investigation of the virus’s origins?

Relman: A credible investigation should address all plausible scenarios in a deliberate manner, involve a wide variety of expertise and disciplines and follow the evidence. In order to critically evaluate other scientists’ conclusions, we must demand their original primary data and the exact methods they used — regardless of how we feel about the topic or about those whose conclusions we seek to assess. Prior assumptions or beliefs, in the absence of supporting evidence, must be set aside.

Investigators should not have any significant conflicts of interest in the outcome of the investigation, such as standing to gain or lose anything of value should the evidence point to any particular scenario.

There are myriad possible sources of valuable data and information, some of them still preserved and protected, that could make greater clarity about the origins feasible. For all of these forms of data and information, one needs proof of place and time of origin, and proof of provenance.

To understand the place and time of the first human cases, we need original records from clinical care facilities and public health institutions as well as archived clinical laboratory data and leftover clinical samples on which new analyses can be performed. One might expect to find samples of wildlife, records of animal die-offs and supply-chain documents.

Efforts to explore possible laboratory origins will require that all laboratories known to be working on coronaviruses, or collecting relevant animal or clinical samples, provide original records of experimental work, internal communications, all forms of data — especially all genetic-sequence data — and all viruses, both natural and recombinant. One might expect to find archived sequence databases and laboratory records.

Needless to say, the politicized nature of the origins issue will make a proper investigation very difficult to pull off. But this doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t try our best. Scientists are inquisitive, capable, clever, determined when motivated, and inclined to share their insights and findings. This should not be a finger-pointing exercise, nor an indictment of one country or an abdication of the important mission to discover biological threats in nature before they cause harm. Scientists are also committed to the pursuit of truth and knowledge. If we have the will, we can and will learn much more about where and how this pandemic arose.  

This is the first installment in a series leading up to the publication of Fateful Decisions.

China has tremendous resources, both human and financial, but it may now be facing a perfect storm of challenges. Its future is neither inevitable nor immutable, and its further evolution will be highly contingent on the content and efficacy of complex policy choices.

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One of these challenges — how China must soon achieve economic growth as it grapples with the realities of a rapidly aging population and a shrinking workforce — is the subject of a chapter authored by Karen Eggleston, the deputy director of APARC and director of the Center’s Asia Health Policy Program. In the following interview, Eggleston shares perspectives from her chapter, “Demographic Challenges.”

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Q: What are some of the fateful decisions China is facing regarding the responsibilities of caring for a large, aging population?

A: China has achieved impressive improvements in health and longevity. It has implemented universal health coverage and is experimenting with financial support for long-term care for older adults. Yet significant gaps between the most- and least-privileged Chinese citizens persist, and in some cases are growing. As I have written elsewhere, it is not surprising that there are wide disparities in health and healthcare between different population subgroups in a country as populous, expansive, and diverse as China. How effectively and efficiently China meets these and other health- and aging-related issues will have a major impact on its ability to manage other social and economic challenges.

In the chapter I contributed to the volume Fateful Decisions, I note that China’s current population and demographic trends — including relatively rapid aging — reflect the success of earlier investments in infectious disease control, public health measures, and other contributors to mortality reduction. The lingering effects of family planning policies, historic preferences for sons, and rapid economic development are also major considerations. Together, these factors have produced a shrinking working-age population, a growing number of elderly, a gender imbalance, and hurdles for inclusive urbanization. An urgent question for China’s future is to what extent policies will ameliorate disparities in health, healthcare use, and the burden of medical spending.

The unfolding COVID-2019 outbreak is a powerful illustration of just how fateful decisions about health systems can be. Compared to the SARS outbreak almost two decades ago, China has been better prepared for this situation. SARS raised health system reform to the top of the political agenda and, many argue, played a direct role in China’s achieving universal health coverage and vastly strengthening the public health system.

But as China has become a middle-income global economic powerhouse in the years since SARS and the ensuing wave of health policy reforms, the expectations of its citizens about their health system have also risen. Has the health system, including public health and medical care, been strengthened to the same degree as other parts of the economy and public services? The impact of and lasting response to COVID-2019 may prove a litmus test.

Q: Why do these decisions about health carry such importance for China’s future development?

Through the last four decades, China has benefitted from a demographic dividend caused by the large bulge in the working-age population. But to achieve future economic growth and productivity, investments in human capital — particularly in health and education —need to be made. This higher productivity will, in turn, be the means by which a smaller workforce can support China’s large and growing cohort of retirees.

As we’ve already seen, health expenditures have increased rapidly as China has developed its system of universal health coverage. Double-digit health spending growth surpassed the rate of economic growth, and as a result, health spending absorbs an increasingly larger share of the total economy. China needs to make sure additional spending on health and elderly care is efficient and effective, while also addressing the nonmedical determinants of health and promoting healthy aging. The health system needs to be reengineered to emphasize prevention, provide coordinated health care for people with multiple chronic diseases, assure equitable access to rapidly changing medical technologies, and ensure long-term care for frail elderly, all without unsustainable increases in opportunity costs for China’s future generations.

Q: What is the Chinese government doing to improve healthcare quality and delivery, and what more could it do to affect meaningful change in its systems?

China’s current policies seek to balance individual responsibility, community support, and taxpayer redistribution through safety-net coverage funded by central and local governments. Like many countries, China would benefit from improved coordination across multiple agencies and structure incentives to avoid or mitigate unintended consequences that undermine the goals of its health system. Recent governance reforms, such as the creation of the National Healthcare Security Administration, aim to address these challenges.

China’s achievements and remaining challenges can be illustrated with the Healthcare Access and Quality Index (HAQ), which measures premature mortality from causes that should not occur if the individual had access to high-quality healthcare: among 195 countries and territories, China achieved the highest absolute increase in the HAQ Index from 2000 to 2016. However, the 43-point regional disparity in HAQ within China is the equivalent of the difference between Iceland (the highest HAQ in the world) and North Korea.

Q: The subject of your chapter, China’s demographic challenges, is one of the issues you investigate in your upcoming book, Healthy Aging in Asia. As you show in this volume, challenges at the intersection of aging, economics, demographic transition, and healthcare policy are not unique to China. How are other countries in Asia responding to them and what lessons could benefit China?

 As I note in the introduction of Healthy Aging in Asia, the demographic transition from high to low fertility and mortality has been more rapid in much of Asia than in Europe and North America. That means social institutions, such as retirement, living arrangements, and intergenerational support, have to adapt quickly. For example, extending work-lives (as is happening in Japan) will be necessary but feasible only if the added years are healthy ones and equitable only if the least advantaged also benefit from healthy aging. The blessings of longevity dim when clouded by pain, disability, and loss of dignity.

 Investment strategies in insurance and managing chronic conditions are also important considerations. Japan and Korea have adopted insurance systems for financing long-term care for frail elderly, while places like Hong Kong have good empirical research on chronic condition management.

 No country or system has a “magic pill” to address these challenges, but the empirical evidence and rich policy experience documented in Healthy Aging from health systems as diverse as those in the cities of Singapore and Hong Kong to large economies such as Japan, India, and China can certainly be instructive.

Updated January 24
Millions of residents in China are under lockdown measures as the number of reported deaths from the coronavirus outbreak rises to 26. In the United States, dozens of people are being monitored for the virus. The World Health Organization on January 23 said at a press conference the outbreak did not yet constitute a global public health emergency.

The outbreak of a novel coronavirus that began in December 2019 in Wuhan, China “is evolving and complex,” said the head of the World Health Organization (WHO) after its emergency committee convened on Wednesday, January 22, and decided that more information was needed before the WHO declares whether or not the outbreak is a public health emergency of international concern. The new virus, known as 2019-nCoV, causes respiratory illness and continues to spread across China. Chinese health authorities, reports the Washington Post, announced that at least 17 people have now died as a result of infection and confirmed cases have been reported in Japan, Thailand, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Macao, with one travel-related case detected in the United States, in the State of Washington. The WHO decision was made as the city of Wuhan shut down all air and train traffic to try to contain the spread of the virus.

With concern over and coverage of the situation rapidly developing, Karen Eggleston, APARC Deputy Director and the Asia Health Policy Program Director at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, offered her insights on the outbreak and its impact on both Asian and international healthcare systems.

Q: Why has this outbreak raised so much concern in China and internationally, and how worried should people be about it?

Infectious disease outbreaks can challenge any health system. Events such as SARS, Ebola, and MERS outbreaks, and even the devastating flu pandemic a century ago, remind us of the frightening power that infectious diseases with high-case fatality can have. The global burden of mortality and morbidity is mostly from non-communicable chronic diseases, but no country or society is immune to old, newly emerging, and re-emerging infectious diseases. And although health systems are generally stronger now and have more technologies to trace and contain outbreaks, there are also deep and complicated challenges that make swift, coordinated disease response difficult even in the modern era.

Any government leadership or healthcare responders who have tried to manage an outbreak situation before are hyper-aware of the need to prepare for and manage future incidents, but we are living in a moment of very complicated social dynamics surrounding public health and healthcare. Distrust in drug companies and government agencies, controversies over vaccines, and increasing skepticism in science, even if only from vocal minorities, all make it more difficult to manage a cohesive international response to an outbreak situation and protect vulnerable people.

Q: As you’ve mentioned, many people looking at this situation with the memory of outbreaks such as SARS or H1N1 in mind. How is the Chinese government addressing this crisis and how does its reaction compare with China’s history of emergency health responses?

China’s health system is much more prepared now, compared to the SARS crisis 17 years ago. More training and investment in primary health care, disease surveillance and technology systems for tracking and monitoring outbreaks, and the achievement of universal health coverage with improving catastrophic coverage even for the rural population, all suggest a health system that is much better prepared to handle a situation like this. Top-level leadership in China had already begun to publicly address the situation within days of the outbreak to assure the public that strict prevention measures will be taken and to urge local officials to take responsibility and share full information. Until more information is gained and more is understood about the nature of this virus, it’s been categorized as a “Grade B infectious disease” but will be managed as if it is a "Grade A infectious disease," which requires the strictest prevention and control measures, including mandatory quarantine of patients and medical observation for those who have had close contact with patients, according to the commission. China currently only classifies two other diseases as Grade A infection diseases—bubonic plague and cholera—and so that tells you something about how seriously this is being treated by those in leadership positions.

Q: And what about the response from the international health communities?

As with any major healthcare crisis, health systems around the globe must also respond with alacrity and integrity, including effective surveillance, monitoring, and infection control. Individuals also play a crucial role in supporting the instructions and recommendations made by established healthcare professionals. For example, the individual with the confirmed case in Washington State proactively told medical personnel about his recent visit to the Wuhan area. His medical providers then exercised appropriate levels of caution, given the unknown nature of the virus, and isolated him while his symptoms developed. He is currently combatting an infection similar in severity to that of mild pneumonia, and so far no other cases have been reported in the United States, though some may arise in the coming days and weeks.

There is always a fine balance between safeguarding public health while still respecting individual rights, civil liberties, and undertaking a prudent, scientific response. The aim is to remain clear and transparent in communications and actions without reverting to disproportionate or overly aggressive responses which lead to panic, distortion, and misinformation about the situation. Some countries, like the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, may choose to seal their international borders until more is understood about the nature of this virus, but most nations will use tried-and-tested methods of monitoring travelers and alerting population health systems so that information about cases is widely available to health authorities and medical researchers trying to understand the cause and develop a potential cure.

Q: As this situation continues to develop, and with inevitable future disease outbreaks around the globe, what would you hope people keep in mind about the role we all play in healthcare crises and in public health?

One issue this outbreak reminds us of in a visceral and intimate way is how closely people are linked together across the world. Globalization and air travel almost instantaneously link continents, countries, and regions. The timing of this outbreak is particularly fraught, because it’s the beginning of the Lunar New Year, when there is a vast migration of people both within China, throughout greater Asia, and across the globe as massive populations go home to celebrate the holidays with family. The potential for a contagious disease to spread easily through crowds and across borders in circumstances like this is very high, and highlights the need for the international communities to share information, scientific expertise, and understanding.

We need to remember that this is not just a problem in a remote part of the world that has no impact on those of us who live in relative comfort in high-income countries. Rather, this is something that could easily impact anyone. Perhaps this latest outbreak and response will showcase how vital additional, ongoing investments in both domestic and international healthcare systems, technologies, and people are.

An estimated 210,000 girls may have “gone missing” due to China’s “Later, Longer, Fewer” campaign, a birth planning policy predating the One Child Policy, according to a new study led by Stanford Health Policy researchers published by the Center for Global Development.

The study looked at hundreds of thousands of births occurring before and during the “Later, Longer, Fewer” policy to measure its effect on marriage, fertility, and sex selection behavior. The policy, which began in the 1970s and preceded China's One-Child Policy, promoted later marriage, longer gaps between successive children, and having fewer children to cut the country's population. The study emphasizes that because this policy existed before ultrasound technology was widely available — and therefore before selective abortion was an option — these missing girls must have been due to postnatal neglect of infant girls, or in the extreme, infanticide.

The authors of the new study are Grant Miller, director of the Stanford Center on Global Poverty and Development, a core faculty member at Stanford Health Policy and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; Kimberly Babiarz, a research scholar at Stanford Health Policy; Paul Ma and Shige Song.

The researchers found that China’s “Longer, Later, Fewer” population control policy reduced total fertility rates by 0.9 births per woman and was directly responsible for an estimated 210,000 missing girls countrywide. The phenomenon of “missing girls” widely recognized in later years under the One Child Policy is largely thought due to sex-selective abortion after ultrasound technology spread across China.

“Prior research has shown that sex ratios rose dramatically under China's One-Child Policy, leading to stark imbalances in the numbers of men and women. But we’re finding that girls went missing earlier than previously thought, which can in part be directly attributed to birth planning policy that predates the One-Child Policy,” said Grant Miller, a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and a non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development.

The top findings of the study include:

• The birth planning policy reduced fertility by 0.9 births per woman, explaining 28 percent of the overall decline during this period.

• The Later, Longer, Fewer policy is responsible for a roughly twofold increase in the use of “fertility stopping rules,” the practice of continuing to have children until the desired number of sons is achieved.

• The Later, Longer, Fewer policy is also responsible for an increase in postnatal neglect, from none to 0.3 percent of all female births in China during this period.

• Sex selection behavior was concentrated among couples with the highest demand for sons (couples that have more children but no sons), with sex ratios reaching 117 males per 100 female births among these couples.

“Population control strategies can have unforeseen consequences and human costs,” Miller said. “At the same time, as China debates the future of birth planning policies, it’s also important to note that family planning policy does not appear to be the largest driver of fertility.”

Fourteen Stanford researchers addressing global poverty through a range of academic disciplines are receiving a total of $4.6 million in awards from the university-wide Global Development and Poverty (GDP) initiative.

Their projects, which are the first to be funded by the GDP, deal with challenges of health, violence, economics, governance and education in the developing world.

“GDP seeks to transform scholarly activity and dialogue at Stanford around the topic of global poverty, so that the university may have a greater impact on poverty alleviation in developing economies,” said GDP faculty co-chair Jesper B. Sørensen. “By focusing on placing a small number of big bets, GDP encourages researchers to think big, and to move beyond the conventional way of doing things. We are thrilled by the inaugural set of awardees, as they demonstrate the creative, inter-disciplinary approaches that will make Stanford a leader in this area.”

The GDP initiative is part of the Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies (SEED) and is administered in partnership with Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). The GDP is co-chaired by Sørensen, the faculty director for SEED and the Robert A. and Elizabeth R. Jeffe Professor of Organizational Behavior at the Graduate School of Business; and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, senior fellow and director of FSI and the Stanley Morrison Professor at Stanford Law School.

SEED, which seeks to alleviate poverty by stimulating the creation of economic opportunities through innovation, entrepreneurship and the growth of businesses, was established in 2011 through a generous gift from Robert King, MBA '60, and his wife, Dorothy.

Through complementary areas of focus, GDP funding and other SEED research initiatives will stimulate research, novel interdisciplinary collaborations and solutions to problems of global poverty and development. GDP research aims to pursue answers to crucial questions that are essential to an understanding of how to reduce global poverty and promote economic development. That includes governance and the rule of law, education, health, and food security – all of which are essential for entrepreneurship to thrive. By contrast, other SEED research focuses on innovation, entrepreneurship, and the growth of businesses in developing economies.

Since 2012, SEED’s Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Developing Economies Award program also has doled out 22 awards and seven PhD fellowships to help support and scale businesses in developing economies. Among the $1 million in funded projects were studies of how to improve the livelihoods of small-holder cacao farmers throughout the tropics; how to identify startups with high job- and wealth-creating potential in Chile; how political accountability affects the ability to attract investment in Sierra Leone; and how managerial practices affect trade entrepreneurship in China.

First GDP Awards

The first 14 GDP award recipients are professors of economics, political science, law, medicine, pediatrics, education and biology, and senior fellows from FSI, the Woods Institute, and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR).

“Each of these projects cuts across disciplines, reflects innovative thinking, and has the potential to generate crucial knowledge about how to improve the lives of the poor around the world,” Cuéllar said. “These projects, along with a variety of workshops engaging the university and external stakeholders, will help us strengthen Stanford’s long-term capacity to address issues of global poverty through research, education and outreach.”

Among the award recipients is Pascaline Dupas, an associate professor of economics and senior fellow at SIEPR. Dupas, along with faculty from the Center for Health Policy and Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, will launch the Stanford Economic Development Research Initiative using GDP funds.  This initiative will focus on collecting high-quality institutional and individual-level data on economic activity in a number of developing countries over the long term, and making these data available to scholars around the world.

Beatriz Magaloni, an associate professor of political science and senior fellow at FSI, is receiving an award to lead a team focused on criminal violence and its effects on the poor in developing economies, and the practical solutions for increasing security in those regions.

Douglas K. Owens, a professor of medicine and FSI senior fellow, was awarded an award to help him lead a team that will develop models to estimate how alternative resource allocations for health interventions among the poor will influence health and economic outcomes.

Stephen Haber, a professor of political science and history and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, received an award to bring together Stanford researchers interested in examining the long-term institutional constraints on economic development. Their goal will be to provide policymakers with a framework for determining the conditions under which particular innovations are likely to have positive payoffs, and the conditions under which resources will likely be wasted.

Other projects will address the educational impacts of solar lighting systems in poor communities; identifying interventions to improve the profits and safety among poor, smallholder pig farmers in Bangladesh and China; the role of law and institutions in economic development and poverty reduction; and how to rethink worldwide refugee problems. Awards are also being provided to researchers focused on microfinance, online education and teacher training.

The project proposals were reviewed by an interdisciplinary faculty advisory council chaired by Cuéllar and Sørensen. 

“We were very encouraged by the impressive number of project proposals from a wide range of areas and are looking forward to introducing several new capacity and community-building activities in the fall,” Sørensen said.. “This wide range of research initiatives will form a vibrant nucleus for Stanford’s growing community of scholars of global development and poverty.”